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PROTECTING INDIA’S SLUM
DWELLERS: RAJIV AWAS YOJANA’S
SLUM-FREE CITIES PROGRAM AND
THE SEVENTY-FOURTH
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT
INTRODUCTION

I

ndia’s population is becoming increasingly urbanized.1 According to data from the 2001 census, nearly one third of
India’s population is living in urban areas,2 and by 2021 that
percentage is expected to grow to roughly 40% of India’s total
population.3 The central government of India, in an effort to
create economically productive and sustainable cities, has taken steps over the last several decades to facilitate economic development and improve the provision of public services in cities, with a particular focus on developing affordable housing
units and public infrastructure.4
1. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, NATIONAL
URBAN HOUSING AND HABITAT POLICY 3 (2007) (India) [hereinafter HOUSING
HABITAT
POLICY],
AND
http://mhupa.gov.in/policies/duepa/HousingPolicy2007.pdf. India’s central
government defines urban as “a human settlement with a minimum population of 5,000 persons, with 75% of the male working population engaged in
non-agricultural activities and a population density of at least 400 persons
per sq. km.” Id. Further, all statutory towns having a Municipal Corporation,
Municipal Council, or Nagar Panchayat, as well as a Cantonment Board, are
classified as urban. Id.
2. See id. Most of India’s growth is concentrated in its largest cities, with
68.7% of India’s total population living in Class 1 cities (populations in excess
of 100,000). Id.
3. MINISTRY OF URBAN EMPLOYMENT & POVERTY ALLEVIATION, JAWAHARAL
NEHRU NATIONAL URBAN RENEWAL MISSION: OVERVIEW 3 (2005) (India) [hereOVERVIEW],
http://jnnurm.nic.in/wpinafter
JNNURM
content/uploads/2011/01/UIGOverview.pdf; see also HOUSING AND HABITAT
POLICY, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that India’s urban population growth
has been a steady phenomenon, with growth rates between 2.7% and 3.8% in
the five decades leading up to 2001).
4. See HOUSING AND HABITAT POLICY, supra note 1, at 3. India’s Ministry
of Housing & Urban Poverty Alleviation has stressed the importance of housing affordability in cities, since nearly one third of India’s low-income population resides in cities (representing about 80.7 million people). Id. The Ministry has set an “Affordable Housing to All” agenda, which is focused on the
“Economically Weaker Sections (EWS)” and “Low Income Groups (LIG)” sec-
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The decentralization of urban governance is among the policy
objectives that are consistently present in India’s major urban
redevelopment programs.5 Decentralization involves the delegation of designated civic responsibilities to localities and, more
specifically, to the community members themselves, as they are
“the best judges of their needs.”6 One rationale underlying India’s decentralization efforts is that community participation in
government decision making, particularly among politically
disenfranchised groups, will lead to a more equitable distribution of urban infrastructure and more efficient delivery of services.7
India’s decentralization process was embodied in law in 1993
with the passage of the Seventy-Fourth Constitutional

tors. Id.; see also JNNURM OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 3 (documenting the
need for reform initiatives to facilitate investment in basic urban infrastructure and services).
5. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, RAJIV AWQAS
YOJANA (RAY), DRAFT GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION 3 (2011) (India) [hereinafter RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION], available at
http://119.226.159.173/downloads/RAY/Guidelines_Community_Participation
_June.pdf. A central government review of JnNURM revealed that to “ensure
the sustainability of urban transformation,” ULBs must be a part of the implementation of economic development programs. Id.
6. Deepak Sharma, An Evaluation of 74th Constitutional Amendment
Act: A Case Study of Chandigarh, India, 6 J. ADMIN. & GOVERNANCE 83, 89
(2011); see Terry Macdonald, GLOBAL STAKEHOLDER DEMOCRACY: POWER AND
REPRESENTATION BEYOND LIBERAL STATES 40 (2008) (arguing that democratic
institutions need to move away from a “‘closed’ constitutional structure,” to a
more decentralized system of “stakeholder communities” with “participatory
entitlements”). Stakeholders are identified based on their relationship to public power: “It is the communities of individuals whose autonomous entitlements are affected by the exercise of [public] power that should be identified
as the legitimate agents of democratic control, with respect to the particular
political actors that wield this public power.” Id.; see also Clayton P. Gillette,
In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local
Government Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 995–98 (1991) (explaining that
localities are more likely to be responsive to the preferences of local residents
than the state legislature).
7. See John Harriss, “Participation” and Contestation in the Governance
of India Cities, 5 (Simons Papers in Sec. & Dev. No. 8/2010, 2010) (referring
to the 74th CAA’s goal of providing “‘adequate representation’ of women and
the so-called ‘weaker sections’ (an official euphemism for people from historically lower castes)”); see also Sharma, supra note 6, at 89 (explaining that the
74th CAA was designed to “revamp the performance ability of municipalities
so that they are able to discharge their duties efficiently”).
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Amendment Act (“74th CAA”).8 The 74th CAA was intended to
strengthen urban governance through constitutional recognition of urban local bodies (“ULBs”) as the “third tier of urban
governments.”9 However, the implementation of this constitutional amendment has largely been left in the hands of state
governments, which in many cases have resisted a genuine delegation of power to local governments and their citizenry.10
As India’s central government pursues its newest urban redevelopment program, Rajiv Awas Yojana (“RAY”)—a slumfree cities program—it is imperative to question whether there
are local governance frameworks in place to protect the interests of politically disenfranchised slum dwellers, consistent
with the programmatic goals of RAY and the constitutional
mandate of the 74th CAA. Local government capacity is a critical consideration in the context of RAY since RAY’s jurisdictional design embraces a cooperative federalist model.11 Under
this model, the central government crafted the slum-free cities
mandate and set out the programmatic objectives: the participating state governments are responsible for program admin-

8. INDIA CONST. art. 243P–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. Various provisions of the 74th
CAA make clear that while the amendment was passed in 1992, it did not go
into full force until 1993. Id. art. 232I, 243N, 243ZF. Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2010) Unreported Judgments (India), available
at http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=36309 (describing
the “inadequate devolution of powers and functions” at the state level that
prompted the 74th CAA).
9. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE 74TH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, STATE LEVEL REFORMS UNDER
JNNURM 2 (2011) (India) [hereinafter JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION].
10. Harriss, supra note 7, at 9; see also NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS,
IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION (74TH AMENDMENT) ACT ON THE WORKING OF
URBAN LOCAL BODIES xiii (2005) [hereinafter WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL
BODIES]
available
at
http://www.niua.org/Publications/research_studies/74caa_v1/Impact%20of%2
0the%2074th%20CAA-Consolidated%20Report%20Vol%20-%20I.pdf (pointing
out that even when states take steps to create ward committees, those ward
committees remain nonfunctional).
11. See PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WORKS 7 (1986) (introducing the concept of cooperative federalism in the context of U.S. grantin-aid programs initiated in the 1960s, which involved municipal, state, and
federal agencies).
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istration and the local governments are tasked with program
implementation.12
RAY set out a three-pronged approach to improving existing
slums13 and preventing future slum development:14 (1) integrating slums into the formal system of government so slum
dwellers can access the same basic amenities as neighboring
urban residents, (2) tackling the structural issues within India’s formal system of government that cause the creation of
slums, and (3) addressing affordable housing shortages for the
urban poor, which lead to extralegal solutions like slum development in order to survive.15
RAY employs a property rights strategy to prevent displacement of slum dwellers.16 Each qualifying state is to provide
slum dwellers with a legal document of entitlement to ensure
that residents will be able to access dwelling spaces at an affordable cost and receive proper services while new dwelling
units are being constructed.17 In theory, property entitlements
are supposed to prevent the displacement of slum dwellers in
the face of redevelopment.18 However, without the framework
of strong local governments and mandatory local participation,
the assignment of property rights to slum dwellers may not be
enough to deter displacement. This Note argues that full compliance with the 74th CAA is needed before RAY can be implemented in a fashion that is genuinely protective of the rights of
slum dwellers.
But, before reaching the argument that local governments
are not strong enough to be protective of slum-dwellers’ interests, it is necessary to begin with a basic question: why should
12. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 3.
13. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, DRAFT
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARATION OF A SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION UNDER
THE RAJIV AWAS YOJANA 2 (2011) [hereinafter SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF
ACTION], available at http://mhupa.gov.in/ray/planning_guidelines.pdf.
14. Id. (describing the prevention of future slums as a preventative strategy).
15. Id. at 1.
16. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, DRAFT MODEL
PROPERTY RIGHTS TO SLUM DWELLERS ACT 5 (2011).
17. See id.; see also Nisha Kumar Kulkarni, Revisiting Property Rights for
Slum-Dwellers, SEARCHLIGHT S. ASIA (Feb. 26, 2013) (“[The bill] gives eligible
slum-dwellers a dwelling of 25 square meters of carpet area, or its equivalent
land area, at an affordable cost.”).
18. Id. at 6.
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local governments be involved in India’s redistributive programs in the first place? It is conceivable that the shifting of
implementation functions to local governments with more limited capacity actually hinders the proper execution of RAY, and
a more centralized system is preferred.19 Alternatively, one
could argue that the central government’s top-down design of
RAY’s slum-clearance program leads to its own set of inefficiencies, and a significant degree of local control is needed for
effective implementation.20 After placing these competing narratives in the context of contemporary theories of jurisdictional
design, this Note argues that RAY’s jurisdictional model is indeed the correct approach, but requires a strong framework for
resolving jurisdictional conflicts between state and local actors.21 To strengthen India’s local governance framework, this
Note advocates for an amendment to the Constitution of India
(“Constitution”) alongside new central government oversight
functions to expressly and functionally shift delegatory authority of planning functions from states to the central government.
Such an amendment would ensure that wholly local planning

19. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL
DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 31 (2011). Institutional design
hinges on the governmental objectives at stake. Id. If the goal is to understand local preferences and match government resources to those preferences,
local autonomy may be more appropriate. Id. But if local governance structures are weak, their involvement may actually hinder political accountability. See MINISTRY OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND
INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PROJECT
IMPLEMENTERS AND POLICY MAKERS IN INDIA 12 (2011) (India) [hereinafter
DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES],
available at http://www.urbaninfrastructureindia.org/guidebook.html (“If
local government is fundamentally constrained with weak finances and/or
limited mandate, it has minimal influence in shaping development, and cannot be seriously held accountable for improving the living conditions in the
city.”).
20. See DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE
SERVICES, supra note 19, at 12 (detailing the challenges associated with state
and central government tackling everyday quality-of-life issues for urban
dwellers).
21. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1347 (1997). Gillette sets out a framework for
analyzing jurisdictional conflict through the introduction of the “decentralized trump,” which he describes as a “situation in which legislation enacted
by a decentralized unit of government prevails over legislation enacted by the
centralized unit of government of which the decentralized unit is a part.” Id.
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functions, which are often trapped in a battle between state
and local authorities, reside in local hands.
Part I of this Note presents theories of jurisdictional design to
argue that central government oversight with local implementation is preferred in light of RAY’s programmatic mandates.
Part I proceeds with a discussion on the history of local urban
governance in India. Part II introduces the 74th CAA and addresses the implementation challenges associated with this
constitutional amendment. Part III introduces Rajiv Awas
Yojana’s slum-free cities program and considers whether an
allocation of property rights under RAY will effectively protect
the interests of slum dwellers, particularly when full compliance with the 74th CAA has not yet been achieved. Finally,
Part IV recommends an amendment to India’s Constitution to
foster compliance with the 74th CAA while granting more autonomy to local governments.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Theories of Jurisdictional Design
This Note’s primary concern is that India’s slum-clearance
program will inadequately protect the rights of slum dwellers
given the limited capacity of local governments. Yet this hypothesis requires some unpacking—embedded in it is a preference for local government implementation. Some of the hallmarks of local implementation include democratizing functions,
like the fostering of broad-based local participation and “preference satisfaction,” or in other words, responsiveness to community preferences about what public goods local government
should provide and at what level.22
However, there are a number of other plausible jurisdictional
arrangements to consider.23 For instance, RAY could have been
designed as a program both funded and administered by the
central government.24 Or alternatively, the central and state
governments could share funding and administration responsi22. GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 34. Gillette also references Charles Tiebout’s influential observations on jurisdictional competition based on bundles
of public goods, whereby residents vote through locational decisions to access
their preferred set of municipal services. Id.
23. Id. at 31(“[D]etermining the proper scope of local autonomy is largely a
question of institutional design.”).
24. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1347.
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bilities without the participation of local governments.25 And
yet another scenario is one where RAY is entirely decentralized, where local governments create and fund their own slumclearance programs.26
RAY’s existing jurisdictional design—with central government design, state administration, and local implementation—
is preferred so long as there are strong mechanisms in place to
resolve jurisdictional conflict and genuinely delegate implementation to local planning bodies.27 But at present, the partial
implementation of the 74th CAA leaves the door open for frequent jurisdictional conflict between state and local governments on program implementation.28 Until full implementation
of the 74th CAA is achieved, perhaps through a constitutional
amendment, local governments will be unable to adequately
protect the property rights of slum dwellers during the redevelopment process.
Intuitively, it is unsurprising that the jurisdictional design
for a particular program should vary with public sector objectives.29 Redistributive programs, which shift resources from
one segment of the population to benefit another group, pose
unique challenges for local governments.30 To illustrate the dynamic, imagine a simple theoretical example involving two
nearby cities—City A and City B. City A undertakes a program
that redistributes wealth to low-income residents, while City
B’s policies remain unchanged. Low-income residents in City B
will flock to City A to tap into City A’s redistributive programs.31 But that is not the only population shift that occurs:
middle- and high-income residents of City A will move to City
B to escape the tax burdens associated with City A’s redistributive programs.32 Consequently, City A suffers the loss of a core
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1348.
30. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 15–16.
31. See id.
32. See id. An alternative outcome, though one regularly subject to legal
challenges in the United States, is for municipalities to adopt land use controls that inhibit the entry of lower-income individuals and safeguard a combination of low taxes and desirable municipal services. See Norman Williams
Jr., Planning Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317,
344 (1955) (discussing the underlying motivations for economic exclusion
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portion of its tax base and is saddled with residents that will
require a costly set of social programs.33
It is this possibility of flight between cities that creates a collective action problem among local governments—“no local government will provide redistributive services on its own initiative for fear that it will be unduly burdened by a social problem
while others escape responsibility or, as is often said in this
connection, ride free.”34 Solving this collective action problem
may require a jurisdictional reorganization of the redistributive
program to include state and national actors.35
Broader participation across various levels of government allows for localized costs and generalized benefits to be shared
more evenly.36 As legal scholar Clayton Gillette explains: “if the
objective of government is to solve collective action problems in
the provision of a public good, then government boundaries
should coincide with the geographical scope of the benefits generated by government provision or production of that good.”37
Many redistributive programs provide widespread social benefits beyond the immediate recipients, but the burdens remain
entirely localized.38 Central and state government intervention

within local communities, including the preservation of property values and
neighborhood character).
33. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 15–16.
34. Id. at 16. But see GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 31 (testing this conventional theory of local redistribution and urban finance, and arguing that
there are indeed circumstances where “a locality characterized by a wellworking political process would be willing to adopt local redistributive programs”).
35. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1348.
36. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 16. There is also an important role for
courts to play in assessing the legal validity of local redistributive programs
and setting precedents that could be adopted across a region. For instance, in
the exclusionary zoning context, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Southern
Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel set a precedent for looking
regionally to assess local affordable housing burdens, noting that “the universal and constant need for [affordable] housing is so important and of such
broad public interest that the general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and
cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality.” 67 N.J. 151, 179 (1975).
37. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1348.
38. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 16 (explaining the far-reaching impacts of a given local government’s program: “If, however, a locality does not
redistribute resources to help those in need, other localities suffer: either they
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may be warranted in a situation where redistributive programs
are addressing concerns that impact several spatial frames:
local, regional, and perhaps even national.39
Assuming central government intervention is needed, one
must question how much responsibility central governments
should take on for a given redistributive program. While central governments can help adjust burdens and incentives in
support of local redistribution, the conventional fear is that
they will be too far removed from localized social issues to intervene effectively.40 Some theorists have turned to the following distinction for determining what level of central government intervention is appropriate: when programs can be administered on relatively objective and easily reviewable
terms—like a welfare cash award or a social security payment—centralized funding and administration may be the
most efficient.41 Alternatively, when a redistributive program
involves the public provision of a commodity—like housing or
other social services—coordination with local government is
often needed for effective implementation.42
This theoretical distinction suggests that RAY’s jurisdictional
design may very well be ideal in light of its more nuanced programmatic objectives: upgrading slum conditions and providing
suitable affordable housing for the poor.43 Then again, what
this distinction does not capture is the potential for jurisdictional conflict. In his analysis of local government involvement
in redistributive programs, Gillette pointed to the potential for
jurisdictional conflict when multiple layers of government are
(or could be) involved.44 These conflicts generally relate to ammust take up the burden or their residents must witness the resultant suffering”).
39. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1347.
40. See ROBERT DAHL & EDWARD TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 134–35
(1973) (noting that “a larger political system, confronted by the disadvantages of boundaries larger than the problems it wishes to deal with by
uniform rules, may be driven successively from one alternative to the next
until it has transformed itself into a congeries of smaller political systems”).
41. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 17 (emphasis added).
42. Id.; see also Gillette, supra note 21, at 1348–49 (“If the function [of
government] is to foster self governance, the government should be small
enough to permit participation.”).
43. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13.
44. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1354 (explaining that although there may be
“significant advantages to retaining some degree of autonomy at the decen-
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biguous statutory or constitutional language that may undermine local authority.45 Thus, when a redistributive program
involves multiple jurisdictional layers, clear statutory and constitutional delegations can help to minimize jurisdictional conflict.46
In addition, this statutory and constitutional language should
embrace local governance structures by formalizing some degree of autonomy.47 Legal scholars have long addressed the
tendency of courts and legislatures to undermine the power of
local institutions.48 For instance, David J. Barron’s seminal
piece on localism in the United States described the historically
weak protections given to local governance structures.49 Barron
underscored the importance of these local structures in promoting substantive constitutional values and offering a forum for a
counter-majoritarian voice.50 Barron’s powerful defense of localism stressed that:
[t]owns and cities are often the institutions that are most directly responsible for structuring political struggles over the
most contentious public questions, whether they concern the
proper means of overcoming racial stratification, securing
quality public education, or protecting disfavored groups from
private discrimination.51

Theoretical contributions on the importance of localism and the
risks of jurisdictional conflict therefore suggest the need for
clear constitutional and statutory delegations that both stabilize local entities and promote local autonomy.52 By providing
unambiguous constitutional and statutory underpinnings for
localism, governance structures are better equipped to support

tralized level,” decisions need to be made on how to resolve conflict across
different jurisdictional levels).
45. GILLETTE, supra note 19, at 26.
46. Id.
47. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 487–91 (1999) (defending the important public functions that local governments play in society and critiquing
the current treatment of local governance in the United States).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 490–91.
51. Id. at 491.
52. Gillette, supra note 21, at 1347; Barron, supra note 47, at 490–91.
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complex jurisdictional designs like RAY, which involve multiple
layers of government in a redistributive program.
B. The History of Local Governance in India
The above analysis on jurisdictional design applies when
there are democratic institutions at various spatial increments
(e.g., state and local) to collaborate with.53 India’s democratic
governance structures have the unique feature of being embodied in the very text of the Constitution.54 Although urban governance structures have existed in India for centuries, the constitutional recognition of local government is a recent innovation.55
During the British colonial period, there were several welldocumented efforts to expand municipal administration, beginning with the Charter of James II in 1687, which granted legal
authority to the East India Company to create municipal corporations.56 In the nineteenth century, there was widespread
understanding of the need for local institutions to address the
unsanitary conditions that were widespread across India’s
towns and cities, and municipalities soon proliferated.57 How-

53. See PETERSON, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that cooperative federalism
requires multiple layers of government that depend on one another).
54. See INDIA CONST. art. 243P–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. Cf. Barron, supra note 47, at
490 (pointing out that local governments, like towns, are not part of the United States’ federal constitutional structure).
55. Soumen Bagchi, Decentralised Urban Governance in India: Implications for Urban Infrastructure, ECON. & POL. WKLY. (2004) (tracing municipal
administration to India’s ancient beginnings—the period of the Indus Valley
Civilization (2300–1750 B.C.)); see also Rumi Aijaz, Challenges for Urban
Local Governments in India 6 (Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 19,
2007) (noting that evidence of urban life in the Indus Valley Civilization existed in the form of “wide streets, market places, public offices, community
baths, drainage and sewerage system[s]”).
56. Bagchi, supra note 55, at 2 (detailing additional steps toward decentralization, such as the creation of the Mayor’s Court in 1726 in the three
Presidency towns of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta); see Vikrant Narayan
Vasudeva, Legal Intervention in Poverty Alleviation: Enriching the Poor
Through Law, 2 NUJS L. REV. 447, 447 (2010) (remarking on how the colonial period marked India’s “plunge into mass poverty”).
57. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 6. In 1850, the British Colonial Government
passed an act that created local committees designed to improve public
health. Id. However, there were still significant barriers to public participa-
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ever, the strengthening of municipal institutions was not without considerable resistance; many central government officials
considered the decentralization reforms of the late 1800s too
radical.58 Moreover, Indians struggled to obtain political rights
within the newly constituted urban governance frameworks,
while British “district officers in those days were not sympathetic to the idea of extension of the elective principle.”59
Although there were a few isolated examples of genuine integration of Indians in the administration of the colonial government, most power remained firmly entrenched in the hands
of unelected district officers that were reluctant to implement
decentralization reforms.60 The passage of the Government of
India Act in 1919 was the colonial regime’s first formal statutory attempt to transfer power from district officers to popularly
elected local bodies.61 Yet, this decentralization effort was unsuccessful, in part because of an inadequate legal framework
for regulating municipal affairs.62 In fact, “several municipalities [were] superseded on the charges of corruption and inefficiency,” which significantly undermined the decentralization
movement.63 The power struggles and pitfalls associated with
the British colonial regime’s decentralization reforms would

tion in 1863, when the Royal Army Sanitation Commission reported the “fast
deteriorating sanitation conditions” across the country. Id.
58. Id. at 7. In 1882, Lord Ripon was a staunch advocate for local selfgovernment, financial decentralization, and elections to constitute local bodies. Municipal Acts were passed under Lord Ripon that embodied these principles, but “achieved little success, since they were considered too radical.” Id.
59. Id. at 6. In the late 1800s, “municipalities [were] established in every
town of importance. However, these municipal bodies were completely under
the control of the district magistrate and the town people were associated
only for raising funds for the maintenance of police, conservancy and road
repairs.” Id.
60. Id. at 7. Calcutta and Bombay provided early examples of successful
local self-government. For instance, in 1888, the Bombay City Municipal
Corporation Act was passed, which created a City Council comprised of a
combination of elected and nominated members. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (explaining that “laws governing local bodies enacted during the
period 1917 to 1937 fail[ed] to prescribe an effective system for day-to-day
management of municipal affairs; hardly any attention was paid to the question of administrative efficiency and fixation of responsibility for the proper
performance of municipal functions”).
63. Id.
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ultimately turn out to be a familiar refrain for urban dwellers
over a century later.64
India became independent from Great Britain in 1947, and
within three years the sovereign nation had drafted its own
Constitution.65 Virtually absent from the Constitution was any
reference to systems of urban governance; legislative authority
over India’s cities was delegated to the states.66 Until 1992, India’s Constitution recognized two tiers of government—the national government and the states as subnational units.67 Although some urban local governments remained in place, “they
were organized on the basis of the ultra vires principle, meaning that there was no established legal authority for their operation and they could be completely dissolved by the states.68

64. Mayraj Fahim, Local Government in India Still Carries Characteristics
of Its Colonial Heritage, CITY MAYORS (May 24, 2009).
65. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7; see also Shubham Chaudhuri, What Difference Does a Constitutional Amendment Make? The 1994 Panchayati Raj Act
and the Attempt to Revitalize Rural Local Government in India (Columbia
Univ., Working Paper 4, 2003). India’s post-colonial government is structured
as
a federal parliamentary democracy made up of 28 states and 7 union
territories. At the national level, legislative authority rests with the
two houses of the parliament: the Lok Sabha (House of the People),
which consists of 545 members, all but two of whom are directly
elected from single-member parliamentary constituencies distributed proportionally on the basis of population among the state and union territories; and to a lesser extent, the Rajya Sabha (Council of
States), which has no more than 250 members, most of whom are indirectly elected by the members of the state legislative assemblies of
the various states.
Id.
66. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7. While there were provisions for the governance of rural settlements, the Constitution’s only direction with respect to
urban local government was to delegate authority to state governments without any specific direction. Id.; see also Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4 (describing the structure of the Constitution prior to the 74th CAA, with List 1
(the Union List), where the Central government has exclusive authority, and
List 2, with the areas where states have exclusive legislative authority). Areas where states were granted authority include “law and order, public health,
agriculture, wealth taxes, land tenure, and land reforms, and most notably in
the current context, functions of local government.” Id.
67. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4.
68. Sharma, supra note 6, at 85 (explaining that since local governments
were not constitutionally required, “state governments were at liberty to ex-
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India’s local governments were largely neglected, with little
attention paid to functional issues, like the provision of public
goods, or structural issues, such as mandating regular elections
or mechanisms for public participation.69 Meanwhile, the central government’s bureaucracy grew as it focused on a system
of expansive control over economic growth through a mix of tariffs, subsidies, industry regulation, and in some cases, nationalization of certain industries.70
In the decades leading up to decentralization reforms, the
“centralized apparatus of the Indian developmental state” functioned as a barrier to successful revitalization and equitable
service delivery in cities.71 As one scholar pointed out when discussing India’s vast central government bureaucracy, “the inefficiency of India’s managed economy is symbolized by the fact
that a nation with widespread poverty, and unemployment or
underemployment, has at the same time one of the world’s
most capital intensive developing economies.”72 The inequality
associated with India’s centrally-managed economy led to questions about the proper role for the central government in the
marketplace and how to craft redistributive programs that
benefit the poor.73

tend or control the powers through executive decisions without an amendment to legislative provisions”).
69. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7 (noting that local governments were neglected in the 1950s without formal constitutional recognition); see also
Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 2 (explaining that the 74th CAA provided the
impetus for regular elections and more representative participation in government).
70. DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 32 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1996).
71. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4 (tracing India’s dismal record in the
provision of public goods and in the sphere of human development); see also
MUELLER, supra note 70, at 32–33. As of 1996, when this text was written,
poverty rates were roughly the same as they were pre-independence, with
50% of the population living in poverty. Id. Mueller notes that “at least some
of the blame of this poor performance must be placed on India’s government
and its political institutions.” Id.
72. MUELLER, supra note 70, at 32.
73. Id. at 33. India poses the question of “the proper role of government in
providing those goods and services that government can provide more efficiently than the market, and also the question of the optimal amount of redistribution.” Id. Additional examples of the inefficiency of the central government include the lack of spending on education relative to other develop-
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The central government’s oversight of urban governance provides an illuminating example of inefficiency within its bureaucratic apparatus.74 Rather than identifying a particular ministry to focus on urban governance issues, the central government erratically shifted primary oversight between different
ministries, which limited meaningful policy reform in cities.75
Despite (or perhaps, because of) the central government’s
fragmented approach to urban governance, a more concerted
effort began in earnest in the late 1980s to strengthen urban
local governments.76 One scholar pointed out how the decentralization effort was uniquely driven by generalized social and
economic forces:
[W]hereas in some countries the impetus for decentralization
has come from external sources or has been triggered by an
economic crisis, in India, it was home-grown and there was no
single precipitating event that led to the reform. That is not to
say, however, that the pressure for reforms came from the
grassroots. Instead the reforms reflected the emergence of a
remarkable consensus among India’s policy-making and intellectual elites. 77

Prior to the 74th CAA, there were two failed attempts at constitutional amendments to strengthen urban local governments: the first in 1989 (the 63rd Amendment) and the second
in 1991 (the 73rd Amendment Bill).78 One of the main arguments against constitutional recognition of urban local governments was that it would constrain the rights of state goving nations, and the challenges the police face in controlling public order,
with violence steadily increasing over the last twenty years. Id.
74. Id. at 32. (“A vast bureaucracy was created to guide the economy, a
bureaucracy that has grown more corrupt and inefficient over time.”).
75. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7 (listing the many agencies that had overlapping responsibilities for overseeing urban local governments, including the
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Ministry of Health and Family Planning, etc.).
76. Id. In 1985, the Ministry of Urban Development was created, functioning as a coordinating agency for urban governance. The National Commission
on Urbanisation was also established to analyze the increasing trend toward
urbanization in India. Id. But see Harriss, supra note 7, at 5 (remarking that
the constitutional reform efforts were focused on rural governance structures
rather than decentralization for urban local government; the enactment of
the 74th CAA was described as “an afterthought” for urban areas).
77. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 4.
78. Aijaz, supra note 55, at 7–8.
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ernment.79 As one local government advisor described the debate, “a primary reason for the delay was that local governments were perceived to be rivals, rather than complements, by
state governments. Hence, local government was not maintained with commitment and sufficiently empowered in the
post-independence era.”80
II. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE 74TH
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT ACT
There are numerous examples of central governments initiating decentralization reforms.81 But what distinguishes India’s
decentralization effort is that the central government created
the 74th CAA, but left implementation of the letter and spirit
of the 74th CAA to the states.82 As will be more fully discussed
in Part II.B, India’s state-level implementation model has led
to mixed results, with weak compliance in areas critically important to local participation.83 The central government has
initiated programs to foster greater compliance with the 74th
CAA, like the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission, but it remains unclear whether such programs have tangibly advanced the decentralization agenda.84

79. See Fashim, supra note 64. States exercised varying degrees of power
over functions that were ultimately devolved to local governments in the 74th
CAA. See Darley Jose Kjosavik & Nadarajah Shanmugaratnam, Between Decentralized Planning and Neo-liberalism: Challenges for the Survival of Indigenous People of Kerala, India, 40 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 632, 633 (2006) (describing the serious impact that decentralization had on the state of Kerala in
light of the state’s significant role in development projects).
80. Fashim, supra note 64.
81. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 2.
82. In many other countries “the impetus for decentralization reforms originated at the national level and implementation responsibility also resided at
the national level.” Id.
83. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2. (“The existing legal
framework as defined by the state municipal acts was not conducive for implementing the provisions of the 74th CAA in its true spirit.”).
84. See M.P. MATHUR, IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION (74TH) AMENDMENT ACT
ON URBAN LOCAL BODIES: A REVIEW, NAT’L INST. OF URBAN AFFAIRS (2007) (offering the most comprehensive summary to date on decentralization reforms).

2014]

SLUM-FREE CITIES PROGRAM

931

A. Passage of the 74th CAA and Core Provisions for Local Participation
There are competing narratives on the political forces that ultimately tipped the scales in favor of a constitutional amendment.85 One narrative relates to the growing frustration
around the poor living conditions in the cities, while the other
suggests that there were strong political forces advocating for
local governance structures in rural areas, and cities were included merely as an afterthought.86 While the true impetus
remains in question, the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act
eventually passed in 1992, providing the constitutional underpinnings for local government entities in cities.87 A landmark
step toward decentralization, the 74th CAA gives legal recognition to urban local bodies (“ULBs”), creating a uniform local
governance structure for cities across the country.88 The 74th
CAA recognizes that ULBs can foster more community participation, address unmet infrastructure needs, fight poverty, and
promote equity.89 Included in the contents of the 74th CAA are
four mechanisms to achieve these goals.90
First, the 74th CAA sets out three different types of municipalities based on the urban landscape.91 Nagar panchayat is
the designation for areas that are transitioning from rural to
urban, municipal councils are for smaller urban areas, and
85.
86.
87.
88.

Harriss, supra note 7, at 5.
Id.
Id.
D.P. Tiwari, Challenges in Urban Planning for Local Bodies in India,
GEOSPATIAL MEDIA & COMM., available at http://www.gisdevelopment.net/
application/urban/overview/urbano0037a.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
89. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2. See also DEVELOPING
SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, supra note 19,
at 12. The 74th CAA designates local institutions as the providers of urban
services, including the development of new parks, support for new employment opportunities, and investment in core infrastructure like “water, sewer
and electrical supply.” The amendment was also designed to address the
problem of “representational distance,” where urban dwellers would have to
turn to the state capital to address everyday issues. Id. The 74th CAA,
through its formal acknowledgement of local institutions, aimed to mitigate
“[the] wide gap between citizens and central or state representatives [which]
create[d] a relatively small and privileged group of high-powered brokers
[and] encourage[d] trading money for access.” Id.
90. INDIA CONST. art. 243P–243ZG, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993.
91. Id. art. 243Q.
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municipal corporations are for larger urban areas.92 The 74th
CAA also identifies a number of factors to be used when classifying municipalities into one of these categories, including population size and density, percentage of employment in nonagricultural activities, and the revenue generated for local administration.93
Second, the 74th CAA calls for the creation and constitution
of ward committees as the smallest units of political representation within the ULBs.94 These committees are designed as a
“means of increased democratic participation and of deliberative decision making.”95 While the 74th CAA mandates that
municipal areas with populations of 300,000 or more be divided
into wards,96 the states retain significant discretion with respect to the ward boundaries, the composition of ward committees, and the process for constituting these ward committees.97
Additionally, the 74th CAA makes clear that states are free to
create local participatory bodies in addition to ward committees.98
Third, the 74th CAA requires local elections within municipalities,99 with spots reserved for women and constitutionally
recognized disadvantaged groups.100 One-third of the seats on a
ward committee must be reserved for women belonging to
scheduled castes or scheduled tribes.101 This constitutional provision is designed to allow politically weak groups, like women

92. Id. art. 243Q(a).
93. Id. art. 243Q(2)
94. Id. art. 243S.
95. Harriss, supra note 7, at 9. See also Vani S. Kulkami, The Making and
Unmaking of Local Democracy in an Indian Village, 642 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 152, 153 n.2 (describing the 74th CAA as “an extraordinary
impetus to local democracy” in the context of governance at the village level).
96. INDIA CONST. art. 243R, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993 (“[A]ll the seats in a Municipality shall be
filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies
in the Municipal area and for this purpose each municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies known as wards.”).
97. Id. art. 243S.
98. Id. (“[N]othing in this article shall be deemed to prevent the Legislature of a State from making any provision for the constitution of Committees
in addition to the Ward Committees.”).
99. Id. art. 243R.
100. Id. art. 243T.
101. Id.
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and those belonging to lower castes, to leverage the ULBs as a
forum for civic participation.102
Lastly, the 74th CAA delegates specific governmental functions to municipalities103 and grants them the authority to levy
and collect taxes to carry out those functions.104 The Twelfth
Schedule of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act identifies
eighteen separate functions and responsibilities that should be
delegated to local bodies through state legislation.105 These
functions include urban planning, public health, urban poverty
alleviation, and slum improvement.106
The delegation of substantive functions to local governments
and the ability to raise revenue to carry out those functions are
at the core of local empowerment.107 However, that delegation
of power was left entirely at the discretion of the states in the
74th CAA with the following permissive language: “the Legislature of a State, may, by law, endow—(a) the Municipalities
with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable
them to function as institutions of self government.”108 The
74th CAA uses the same permissive language in its discussion
of taxes and funds for local governments.109
A close reading of the 74th CAA reveals that in addition to
the broad latitude that state governments have over the establishment of ward committees, they retain full control over the
delegation of Twelfth Schedule functions.110 Although the Constitution sets out a number of substantive planning functions
for local governments, delegation does not occur unless a state
102. Harriss, supra note 7, at 5.
103. INDIA CONST. art. 243W, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993.
104. Id. art. 243X.
105. Id. art. 243W, Twelfth Schedule; see also Tiwari, supra note 88, at 2–3.
106. Id. art. 243W, Twelfth Schedule; see also D.S. Meshram, Interface Between Various Agencies under 74th CAA, INST. TOWN PLANNERS INDIA J., Oct.
2004, at 13, available at http://itpi.org.in/pdfs/oct2004/chapter3.pdf (noting
the need for state governments to delegate power over environmental and
urban planning functions to municipalities to comply with the Twelfth
Schedule).
107. Tiwari, supra note 88, at 2–3.
108. INDIA CONST. art. 243W, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993.
109. Id.
110. Id.; see also DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN
INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, supra note 19, at 11 (noting that “much of the
content of the 74th CAA is not mandatory”).
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decides to enact legislation conferring local authority.111 As one
scholar observed, the 74th CAA merely calls upon states to
“devolve powers and resources to local bodies” so they can function as autonomous institutions.112 The 74th CAA clearly articulates a substantive role for ULBs to provide public goods, engage in local planning, reduce poverty, and promote equity.113
Those roles, by constitutional design, hinge on permissive state
legislative action.114
Thus, the 74th CAA’s delegation of substantive powers to local governments—the heart of political empowerment—is conditioned on a willingness of state governments to relinquish
control of certain substantive areas. This makes decentralization uniquely challenging for India: “unlike in many other
countries where the impetus for decentralization originated at
the national level and implementation responsibility also resided at the national level, in India, the final responsibility for
the design and implementation of local government reforms lay
with the states.”115
B. Implementation Challenges Associated with the 74th CAA
Decentralization mandates have been undermined by state
governments trying to retain control over the substantive areas
designated for local authority, like land use planning and development.116 Additionally, many state politicians have felt
threatened by the prospect of decentralization, “fear[ing] the
possible loss of their powers of patronage.”117 One political the-

111. See Subramaniam Vincent & Meera K, Janaspandanas or Ward Committees: Calling the Bluff, CITIZEN MATTERS (July 20, 2009),
http://bangalore.citizenmatters.in/blogs/editors-blog/blog_posts/1222government-janaspandanas-or-ward-committees-calling-the-bluff (describing
the shortsightedness of the 74th CAA in allowing the state governments to
have control over the composition of ward committees).
112. Chaudhuri, supra note 65, at 2.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Harriss, supra note 7, at 7; see also JnNURM Primer (stating that
in order to implement the decentralization agenda, “an attitudinal change” is
needed such that states no longer view ULBs as adversaries, but as partners
to strengthen the governance in their state).
117. Harriss, supra note 7, at 10.
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orist analogized state-level implementation of the 74th CAA to
driving with one foot on the gas and the other on the brake.118
There are a number of studies that evaluate decentralization
following the 74th CAA.119 Yet, it is instructive to begin with a
brief examination of the social and economic forces that have
hindered decentralization reforms. One dynamic that scholars
have observed are the close ties between central and state governments and the capitalist class, which create incentives to
block local participation.120 Many of the large-scale developments occurring in India’s cities are advanced through publicprivate partnerships, with heavy assistance from the capitalist
class.121 These public-private development projects are increasingly changing the urban landscape, with one social anthropologist describing the hegemony of the capitalist class in “shaping the urban form.”122 The challenge for local governments, in
light of this paradigm, is that they are often not a party to the
public-private agreements that set the terms for large-scale developments.123 This is inherently inconsistent with the 74th
CAA, since the Twelfth Schedule specifically articulates urban
planning as a function to be devolved to local governance structures.124
Nevertheless, this lack of local representation may very well
be by design.125 Central and state governments are protective
of their ties to the capitalist class because they want to encourage and protect swift, large-scale investment in India’s cities.126
118. Id. at 7.
119. See, e.g., Bagchi, supra note 55, at 3. A challenge associated with these
decentralization studies lies with setting conceptual definitions to measure
decentralization and its impacts on the allocation of public resources and the
delivery of public goods. Id.
120. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7 (considering the dominance of information
technology firms within the capital class and the real state trends in the city
of Bangalore where there were frequent direct links between IT firms and
state and central government agencies).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 7–8.
124. Tiwari, supra note 88, at 3.
125. Harriss, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing a study on the corporate economies in cities like Bangalore and Ahmedabad, which found limited opportunities for local participation, in part because “their definition of public priorities
is discordant with those that may be expressed by participants in the local
economies”).
126. Id. at 7.
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Local oversight of urban planning has the potential to slow new
development, or even derail important infrastructure investments when there are countervailing community concerns.127
As a result of these dynamics, local governments face an uphill
battle when trying to assume genuine control over the land use
planning process, despite the delegation in the 74th CAA.128
And where states have delegated some control over municipal
planning to local bodies, it is regularly undermined by the
“land poaching” that is characteristic of these public-private
partnerships.129
The public-private partnership paradigm, as described above,
has important class implications for India’s cities.130 The land
that is “poached” for new development often comes from slum
areas, where land can be obtained at relatively low costs.131
Slum dwellers are regularly displaced as state-sponsored developments result in the demolition of their homes.132 This residential displacement sometimes forces slum dwellers out of
their existing communities, since the new development drives
up local land prices.133 Although major development projects
have the potential to tangibly improve the conditions of slum
dwellers, the relative weakness of local governance structures
makes it difficult for the urban poor to secure housing.134 One
scholar observed that “publicly sponsored mega-projects do little to support the local economies that are so important for the
city’s prosperity, and may disrupt them.”135
The emphasis on public-private partnerships in India’s redevelopment schemes has led states to resist genuine implementation of the 74th CAA.136 Meanwhile, limited local government
127. Solomon Benjamin, Governance and Economic Settings and Poverty in
Bangalore, Environment and Urbanization, 12 ENV’T & URB. 1, 35–56 (2000);
see also WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at 1 (noting the
limited capacity of local institutions).
128. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7–8.
131. Benjamin, supra note 127, at 38, 46.
132. Id. at 46.
133. Id. (noting the increased threat of eviction for slum dwellers as a result
of these public-private partnerships).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 44–46 (describing the public-private partnerships as a restraint
of “pro-poor economic activity”).
136. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7–8.
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representation has left slum dwellers without a voice in the
land use planning process, while the capitalist class works on
state-endorsed megaprojects that are likely to redefine the
built form of cities.137 This was precisely the dynamic that the
74th CAA was intended to correct.138 Yet compliance with the
letter and spirit of the 74th CAA has been inconsistent at
best.139
In 2005, the National Institute for Urban Affairs (“NIUA”)
conducted the first comprehensive study on the implementation of the 74th CAA on a national scale.140 Some of the key decentralization metrics that NIUA examined include: (1) the
presence of ULBs, (2) the reservation of seats for women and
underrepresented castes on those ULBs, (3) local elections held
with regularity, and (4) the constitution of ward committees.141
NIUA found that most states were complying with certain provisions of the 74th CAA, like the constitution of ULBs and the
reservation of seats on those ULBs.142 In addition, most states

137. Id.
138. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at vi.
139. Harriss, supra note 7, at 7.
[T]he increasing power of the corporate sector, of the upper middle
class and of real estate developers over the shaping of urban space
provides an indication of the failure, so far, to make a reality of the
intentions of the 74th Amendment with regard to the establishment
of decentralized democratic governance of the cities.
Id.
140. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at vii (assessing decentralization in twenty-seven states and one union territory in India).
NIUA’s study was funded by the central government’s Ministry of Urban Development. Id. NIUA noted that one of the challenges of such a comprehensive assessment was the unavailability of data for certain implementation
metrics; for instance, gender representation on ward committees. Id. There
were also certain regions where data was incomplete. Id. For example, there
were significant data gaps for most of the states in the northeast of India and
the newly formed states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttaranchal. Id. at
vii–viii.
141. Id. at viii. Unfortunately, data constraints limited NIUA’s ability to
look closely at the devolution of powers from the Constitution’s Twelfth
Schedule, like urban planning functions, across states. Therefore, the focus of
their assessment is on key structural changes connected with the 74th CAA,
like the abovementioned ULBs and ward committees. Id.
142. Id. NIUA found that as of 2005, there were over 3,000 ULBs, and that
most states had amended their municipal acts in accordance with Article
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had adopted municipal acts consistent with the 74th CAA to
include the substantive functions from the Constitution’s
Twelfth Schedule (e.g., urban planning, poverty alleviation) as
expressly designated duties of the ULBs.143 However, these
widespread amendments to state municipal acts should not be
taken to imply that these substantive duties were functionally
transferred to the ULBs.144 NIUA noted that in many cases,
states retained control over substantive duties in the Twelfth
Schedule, either in part or in full.145
A look at the status of the ward committees reveals more limited compliance with the 74th CAA; eight out of twenty-eight
states, and one out of seven union territories, had ward committees in place at the time of assessment.146 And even where
ward committees existed on paper, few were operational.147
This is a crucial concern when considered within the larger
context of the decentralization agenda, since ward committees
are the smallest increment of local government and the primary tool for public participation among the politically disenfranchised.148 When ward committees are constituted, they are
tasked with vital civic duties (at least on paper) such as tax collection, budget drafting, public grievances, development planning and monitoring, and slum improvement.149 Structurally,
ward committees are necessary for ensuring that ULBs are
able to effectively represent historically weaker sections of the
urban population.150
NIUA’s observations on devolution of Twelfth Schedule functions and the constitution of ward committees hints at a more
generalized finding on compliance with the 74th CAA: state
legislation delegating power to local institutions is an essential
first step in the decentralization process, but not always suggestive of genuine implementation of the 74th CAA.151 NIUA
243(T) of the Constitution to reserve seats for schedule castes, schedule
tribes, and women in the ULBs. Id. at xi.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also Harriss, supra note 7, at 10.
148. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at vii; see also Harriss, supra note 7, at 10.
149. WORKING OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES, supra note 10, at xiii.
150. Id. at x.
151. Id. at vii.

2014]

SLUM-FREE CITIES PROGRAM

939

highlighted that even in states that have enacted municipal
acts to delegate power to local institutions, local participation
within governance structures remains weak.152 The same is
true for local revenue streams, where despite local legislative
authority to recover tax revenue, municipalities encounter serious delays when trying to access needed funds.153 These findings underscore that formal legislative action is not enough to
implement the 74th CAA. Central government enforcement
may be necessary to ensure that constitutional mandates and
state enactments result in an actual devolution of power to local governments.
C. Compliance with the 74th CAA Through the Jawaharal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission
In 2005, the same year that NIUA’s comprehensive report on
the 74th CAA was released, the central government’s Ministry
for Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation (“MUDPA”)
created a platform for urban revitalization—the Jawaharal
Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (“JnNURM”).154 The
program focuses on a variety of administrative concerns so that
planned developments in cities can move forward with greater
efficiency, transparency, and citizen-centric accountability.155
JnNURM set out a seven-year plan, with a number of reforms
designed to strengthen ULBs. Among those reforms is implementation with the letter and spirit of the 74th CAA.156

152. Id.
153. Id. Even the presence of state finance commissions in some cases did
little to address delays associated with local governments getting approval to
generate their own sources of revenue. Id.
154. Harriss, supra note 7, at 10.
The origins of JnNURM are in the commitment made in 2004 in the
Common Minimum Programme agreed by the Congress Party with
the parties on which it depended for office, to a “comprehensive programme of urban renewal and to a massive expansion of social housing in towns and cities, paying special attention to the needs of slum
dwellers.”
Id.
155. JNNURM OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 5.
156. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2; see also DEVELOPING
SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE SERVICES, supra note 19,
at 11. Nearly two decades after the passage of the 74th CAA, the spirit of the
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When explaining the rationale for focusing on implementation of the 74th CAA, MUDPA echoed many of the findings
from NIUA’s study, with an emphasis on how states have inhibited the autonomous functioning of local governments
through approvals to generate local revenue.157 In light of those
findings, MUDPA created a Model Municipal Law (“MML”) for
state implementation of the 74th CAA.158 The MML is a guide
for states as they adopt municipal acts that incorporate the
74th CAA’s decentralization reforms.159 It provides language
that would allow ULBs to function more autonomously, consistent with the 74th CAA.160
Much of the MML’s language tracks the mandatory requirements of the 74th CAA, such as the creation of local ward
committees.161 In addition, the MML provides for the transfer
of key substantive functions to local governments, an enhanced
ability for local governments to generate revenues, and structural developments to aid in decentralization.162 The MML also
proposes that state and local governments work together to
provide a wider range of services in urban municipalities.163 To
accomplish this, the MML suggests looking to public-private
partnerships to expand the delivery of civic services.164
amendment has not been implemented, but “JnNURM tries to reignite the
decentralization process.” Id.
157. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasizing that states
have struggled to implement many of the provisions of the 74th CAA, that
ULBs have not been properly transferred revenue sources, and that their
autonomy is undermined with state approvals for tax rates, user charges, and
new taxes).
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also INDIA CONST. art. 243S, amended by The Constitution
(Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993.
162. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 4. With respect to structural innovations, the MML includes provisions to develop the State Election
Commission for holding regular local elections, the State Finance Commission to aid local governments in revenue generation, and the District Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees to provide a regional framework for ward committees. Id.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Id. When considering the earlier discussion of how public-private partnerships have undermined local authority, this proposal may actually be in
tension with the 74th CAA’s decentralization agenda. Harriss, supra note 7,
at 7–8.
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JnNURM sets out a series of steps for states and urban municipalities to put the reforms embodied in the MML into practice.165 State-level steps include a review of existing municipal
acts in light of the MML’s language, definitive timelines for legislative action, and a state agenda that allows municipalities to
function as institutions of self-government, with the devolution
of substantive areas listed in the Twelfth Schedule and the delegation of financial powers.166 In addition, at the municipal level, local governments are to clearly delineate the boundaries of
wards, constitute ward committees where the legal authority
exists, and create other governance structures to concentrate
on particular substantive areas (e.g., the financing of municipal
services).167
To encourage states to advance the decentralization agenda,
JnNURM conditioned central government funding for designated urban development projects on the successful implementation of the 74th CAA.168 For example, if a state government
sought funding under JnNURM for municipal solid waste
management upgrades (a JnNURM-eligible project), the state
would first have to show that they had enacted so-called “mandatory reforms” pursuant to the 74th CAA.169 However, these
mandatory reforms are as open-ended as the language calling
for decentralization under the 74th CAA.170 When describing
the 74th CAA compliance requirement for funding, JnNURM
uses ambiguous terms, such as “meaningful association and
engagement of ULBs in planning functions” and demonstration
of “implementation of decentralization measures as envisaged
in the 74th CAA,” rather than conditioning funding on the
more concrete decentralization steps mapped out in the
165. Harriss, supra note 7, at 4–5.
166. Id. at 5. The state-level reforms also called upon state governments to
prepare plans for social justice and economic development, yet it is left unclear if or how those planning efforts would include local governments at the
outset. Id.
167. Id. at 5.
168. JNNURM OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 12.
169. Id. Other projects eligible for JnNURM assistance include waste management, storm-water management, urban transportation, water protection,
soil erosion prevention, and urban renewal—an umbrella term for the redevelopment of aging city areas, including such projects as the widening of narrow streets, the movement of industrial areas outside the central city, trafficreduction measures, sewage and solid-waste disposal upgrades, etc. Id. at 10.
170. Id. at 12.
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MML.171 Moreover, there is little documentation on the extent
to which JnNURM has furthered compliance with the 74th
CAA.172
JnNURM is a guidelines-based regime with an incentive
structure in place to foster reforms consistent with the MML.173
But what is absent from JnNURM is any suggestion of constitutional reform to remove the discretion from states to choose
whether such legislation should be enacted. To the contrary,
the ministry characterizes state municipal laws as required
under the 74th CAA.174 Yet the actual language of the 74th
CAA makes state delegations through municipal acts permissive, leaving a clear opening for states to turn their backs on
the decentralization agenda.175
III. RAJIV AWAS YOJANA AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE 74TH
CAA
A. Core Objectives of Rajiv Awas Yojana’s Slum Redevelopment
Program
The central government announced Rajiv Awas Yojana on
June 4, 2009; a program designed to encourage partnerships
with state and local governments to achieve a “slum-free India.”176 Administered by the Indian Ministry of Housing and
171. Id.
172. The NIUA released a report in 2007 on compliance with the 74th CAA,
however that report merely restated data from October 2004. See MATHUR,
supra note 84.
173. JNNURM IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 3. (“The MML serves as an
illustrative example of how state governments can orchestrate their legal
framework guided by their own choices.”).
174. Id. at 2. The JnNURM primer specifically states that the 74th CAA
“requires the state governments to amend their municipal laws in order to
empower ULBs ‘with such power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self governance.’” Id.
175. INDIA CONST. art. 243W, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Fourth
Amendment) Act, Part IX-A, 1993. However, the ministry’s characterization
of the 74th CAA runs counter to the constitutional text, which states that
“the Legislature of a State, may, by law, endow—(a) the Municipalities with
such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to functions
as institutions of self government.” Id. (emphasis added); see JNNURM
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 9, at 3.
176. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5; see Aarti
Dhar, Expert Panel on Rajiv Awas Yojana Formed, HINDU (Mar. 10, 2010),
available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article223584.ece. In
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Urban Poverty Alleviation, RAY embodies many of the values
of local involvement initially set forth in JnNURM.177 At a high
level, RAY is intended to bring slums178 within India’s formal
governance structures to create parity in terms of urban amenities and tackle some of the underlying structural causes of
slums, like the dearth of suitable affordable housing for the urban poor.179 RAY sets out a mix of curative strategies to upgrade or eradicate existing slums and preventative strategies
to limit new slum development in urban areas.180 RAY’s programmatic scheme is divided into two phases.181 In the first
phase of RAY, which runs from 2011 to 2013, the central government planned to dedicate Rs. 5,000 crore (or roughly one
billion U.S. dollars) for the creation of slum-free city plans and

March 2010, Rs. 60 core were released to twenty states to begin their slumfree city plans. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, STATUS
NOTE ON RAJIV AWAS YOJANA (Mar. 2010) (India), available at
http://mhupa.gov.in/W_new/NOTE_RAJIV_AWAS_YOJANA.pdf.
177. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 3
(finding that an inclusionary approach promotes efficiency with respect to
implementation).
178. The term “slum” is often used loosely to refer to a variety of informal
housing conditions. Adam Auerbach, Clients and Communities: The Political
Economy of Party Network Expansion and Development in India’s Urban
Slums 17 (Aug. 2012) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The
U.N. Habitat defined a slum as a
mainly uncontrolled low-income residential area with an ambiguous
legal status regarding land occupation; they are to a large extent
built by the inhabitants themselves using their own means and are
usually poorly equipped with public utilities and community services
. . . they proliferated with the rapid growth of cities in the less developed countries after the Second World War.
Id. (quoting UNITED NATIONS CTR. FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS, SURVEY OF SLUM
AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS (1982)). In the 1970s, India experienced a surge
in slums as farm workers, looking for more industrial jobs, relocated to cities.
Id. These workers were often squatters and never secured property rights. Id.
This is unsurprising given the types of lands where slums are developed, including “unused government land, hazardous sites unfit for sanctioned urban
development, or private lands under ambiguous ownership.” Id. at 18. Slum
dwellers find these sites attractive for slum development, as eviction in the
near term is unlikely when there are no immediate development plans for the
land. Id.
179. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 1.
180. Id. at 2.
181. EUROINDIA CTR., RAJIV ASAS YOJANA 1 (July 2011).
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the execution of pilot slum redevelopment projects.182 The first
pilot projects were to be funded in cities where central government spending was most likely to be cross-subsidized through
state and local funding and public-private partnerships.183 The
second phase of the program runs from 2013 to 2022, which is
when the redevelopment projects are to be implemented pursuant to the state slum-free city plans.184
RAY requires that participating states create Slum Free City
Plans of Action (“POA”), which map out state and local curative
and preventative measures for slums.185 The central government has articulated a set of core values for these POAs.186
Many of these core values relate to the land tenure rights of
slum dwellers and local participation in slum redevelopment
plans.187 Yet the challenge with these POAs is that they are not
legally enforceable documents.188 As such, POAs may comport
with RAY’s guidelines on paper, but states may choose not to
recognize or fully engage local governments when carrying out
redevelopment projects in slum areas.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of RAY is the requirement that states extend formal property rights to slum dwellers in order to receive any central government redevelopment
funding.189 Thus, before any RAY project is approved, a state
182. See Moushumi Das Gupta, Bill on Property Rights to Slum Dwellers in
the
Works,
HINDUSTAN
TIMES
(Oct.
30,
2012),
http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Bill-on-propertyrights-to-slumdwellers-in-the-works/Article1-952380.aspx.
183. MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, RAJIV AWAS
YOJANA: GUIDELINES FOR SLUM-FREE CITY PLANNING 2 (2012) (India) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR SLUM-FREE CITY PLANNING] (presenting the criteria for
the selection of cities, noting that preference will be given to those that can
maximize cross-subsidization through public-private partnerships); see also
EUROINDIA CTR., supra note 181, at 2. The central government provides 50%
“of slum redevelopment costs, including provision of basic civic [and] social
infrastructure and housing including ownership, rental and transit.” Id.
184. CCEA Nod for Slum-Free India Scheme, YAHOO! NEWS MAKTOOB (Sept.
3, 2013), available at http://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/ccea-nod-slum-freeindia-scheme-180215502.html.
185. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2.
186. Id. at 1.
187. Id.; see also RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note
5, at 3.
188. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2.
189. GUIDELINES FOR SLUM-FREE CITY PLANNING, supra note 183, at 1 (Central government aid under RAY was conditioned on “[s]tates assign[ing] legal
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will need to submit a detailed description of the slumredevelopment site under review, a POA, and a state bill that
formally assigns property rights to slum dwellers.190 Notably,
this bill does not need to be passed to receive funding for a
RAY-sponsored redevelopment program, but the State Cabinets must approve the bill, and the State Assembly must provide the session when the bill will be voted on.191
The central government also described two companion presumptions to guide the slum-free cities process: a preference for
slum-upgrades and for no evictions.192 Beginning with slum
upgrades, the central government has stated that state and local governments should first look to whether conditions can be
improved within urban slums before considering any slumresettlement options.193 Upgrades are classified into a number
of different categories based on the level of capital investment
that is required.194 For instance, a “slum improvement” is the
least capital intensive, involving infrastructure investments in
areas where slum dwellers have constructed incremental housing.195 A “slum upgradation” is more capital intensive, involving both infrastructure and housing unit upgrades to provide a
sufficient base of incremental housing.196 And “slum redevelopment” is the most capital intensive, involving full clearance
of the slums on site and redevelopment of low-cost housing for
slum dwellers on that same site.197 The central government has
expressed that these options are preferred to “slum resettlement,” where slums are cleared and slum dwellers are relocat-

title to slum-dwellers over their dwelling space.”). In order to house displaced
slum dwellers, the central government requires that of the new housing developed in slum areas, 25% should be reserved for the urban poor. Id. An alternative requirement of 35% of dwelling units may apply in urban areas
where the economies are particularly weak.
190. Id. at 2–3.
191. Id.
192. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13; see also GUIDELINES
FOR SLUM FREE CITY PLANNING, supra note 182, at 2 (describing the wholecity approach to slum redevelopment as an “integrated and holistic plan prepared for the upgradation of all existing slums, notified or non-notified, in
each identified city”).
193. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2.
194. Id. at 16.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
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ed to alternative sites.198 Instead, this option should be reserved for “untenable slums,” where upgrades or redevelopment on the site in question is either not possible or practicable.199
If slum resettlement is deemed necessary,200 the central government has advised that alternative housing for slum dwellers should be identified in either the same ward or a nearby
ward to minimize the level of disruption and retain important
community assets.201 Similarly, in the event that eviction is
unavoidable, the central government’s guidelines call upon local governments to consult with the urban poor to identify alternative locations for housing.202 Indeed, the slumredevelopment process is supposed to be driven by the smallest
unit of political representation, the ward committee.203 The
hope is that engagement at the ward committee level will help
align redevelopment priorities with the needs of slumdwellers.204
B. RAY’s Jurisdictional Design
The central government provided recommendations for RAY’s
general administrative arrangements, which are intended to
foster community participation.205 A state-level “nodal agency”
is tasked with program design and oversight responsibilities,
which can be divided into the following three categories: institutional, financial, and planning.206 Institutional responsibilities include establishing statewide slum and household definitions, setting criteria for the prioritization of slums, and developing eligibility criteria for property entitlements for slumdwellers.207 Financial responsibilities include setting external
198. Id. at 2.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Id. at 9. One situation the central government discussed is the identification of slums located on environmentally hazardous sites. Id.
201. Id. at 2.
202. Id. at 1.
203. Id. at 2. Planning at the ward committee level is thought to “ensure
that slum dwellers within a ward or zone continue to live in the same area,
which would promote heterogeneous neighborhoods as well as continuation of
residence-livelihood linkages.” Id.
204. Id.
205. RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 4.
206. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2.
207. Id.
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development charges and subsidies for infrastructure development.208 And planning responsibilities involve monitoring the
local collection of data and ensuring the involvement of ward
committees in that process.209 The state agency administering
RAY is supported by a state-level RAY cell, which is a committee of experts outside of government that serve as advisors to
the state agency.210
At the local level, ULBs are responsible for program implementation.211 Implementation includes slum-level mapping,
door-to-door surveying of slums, designing and implementing
slum redevelopment plans, and program monitoring.212 The
central government contemplates that local administration can
take a variety of forms.213 Under one conception, the ULB retains full control of community surveying through an active
Urban Poverty Alleviation Cell that lends local knowledge and
technical expertise.214 Alternatively, the ULB can contract out
surveying to nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”) and
community-based organizations (“CBOs”) with technical expertise and on-the-ground knowledge.215
One salient feature of RAY is the significant amount of local
government capacity the program requires.216 If one were to
look just at the slum-level mapping function, the requisite level
of technical capacity becomes readily apparent. ULBs must
prepare a list of known slums, identify slum boundaries, identify vacant land for resettlement purposes, and then roughly
map the actual slums, including households, schools, health
care centers, community work spaces, commercial activities,
community halls, night shelter, etc.217 Once slums are mapped,
the ULBs begin a process of household counting, working with
either a selected agency or an NGO to engage community leaders within the slum.218 Community volunteers are assigned to

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id.
Id.
RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 4.
SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2.
Id.
Id.
RAY GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, supra note 5, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
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give each house a unique number and to canvass to ensure that
“every family living in the slum is included in the survey.”219
Looking closely at these various steps is a sure indication that
strong local governance structures are needed to implement
RAY’s programmatic mandates, which have the potential to
displace some of India’s most vulnerable citizens in the name of
redevelopment.220
Where redevelopment through RAY has occurred, there is
some evidence that the quality of new housing built for lowincome families using RAY funds is subpar.221 In fact, the central government is now considering third-party inspections for
low-income housing developed under the program to address
these quality concerns.222 Thus, even where slums are properly
identified, and new housing for slum dwellers is constructed,
there is still a continuous need for local representation to make
sure that new low-income housing is built to last.
C. Limited Redevelopment Progress under RAY Tied to the
Property Rights Scheme
Nearly all states and union territories have received funding
for slum-free city planning under RAY.223 Yet only a fraction of
those states have adopted legislation that would confer full
property rights to slum dwellers, which effectively precludes
RAY funding for the physical redevelopment of slums.224 In
fact, of the Rs. 5000 crore allocated for Phase 1, only Rs. 100
crore had been spent as of October 2012 (which is nearly the
end of Phase 1).225 While states have drafted POAs, very few
have come forward with specific slum development projects.226
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See Third Party Inspections of Rajiv Awas Yojana Units Soon: Maken,
ZEENEWS (Dec. 4, 2012), http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/third-partyinspection-of-rajiv-awas-yojana-units-soon-maken_814580.html.
222. Id.
223. See MINISTRY OF HOUS. & URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION, ALLOCATION
FOR URBAN POVERTY ALLEVIATION SCHEMES (2011) (India), available at
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=75948 (describing the funding that was released for “undertaking preparatory activities in 157 cities
across 34 states and union territories under the Slum Free City Planning
Scheme, the preparatory phase of RAY”).
224. Gupta, supra note 182.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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This is likely due to the “lukewarm” response that states have
had to the property rights requirement for slum-dwellers.227
Based on the reluctance of state governments to enact property rights legislation for slum dwellers, the central government’s Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation unveiled revisions to model property rights legislation.228 The revised bill removed the requirement that slum dwellers receive
permanent ownership rights to a dwelling place, and replaced
it with a provision requiring that states confer leases to slum
dwellers for a minimum of fifteen years.229 The bill retains the
presumption toward slum-upgrades, providing that unless
there is an extreme case, the property entitlements should be
designed to keep slum dwellers in the same area.230 The revised
bill also addresses the problem of encroachment on public
lands, leading to new slum development.231 To deter the creation of new slums, the model bill provides for a system of monetary penalties and even jail time of up to three years for those
that construct illegal structures on public lands.232
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO RAY AND DECENTRALIZATION
REFORMS TO PROTECT SLUM DWELLERS
Contention over key features of the RAY program, like the
Property Rights to Slum Dwellers model bill, suggests that
227. Id. Several policy groups have questioned and critiqued the workability of providing tenure security to slum dwellers. See PATRICIA CLARKE ANNEZ
ET AL., AHMEDABAD, MORE BUT DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT FOR “SLUM FREE” AND
LIVABLE CITIES (World Bank Sustainable Dev. Network, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 6267, 2012).
228. See Gupta, supra note 182.
229. Id. Commentators have indicated that even under the revised bill, the
transfer of property rights is bankable, meaning slum dwellers could use
their entitlements as collateral for a mortgage from banks to build new
homes. Id.
230. See Mahendra Kumar Singh, Slum-Dwellers Will Be Given Property
OF
INDIA
(Oct.
31,
2012),
Right:
Maken,
TIMES
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-1031/india/34836089_1_slum-dwellers-property-rights-ajay-maken. When announcing the revised model bill, the new minister for Housing and Urban
Poverty Alleviation stated, “[W]e plan to rehabilitate those living in slums in
the vicinity of a five km radius where in situ rehabilitation is not possible,”
adding that “shifting the poor away from their source of livelihood would not
solve the problem.” Id.
231. Gupta, supra note 182.
232. Id.
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there is not yet consensus among state and local actors on how
to pursue redevelopment in a fashion that is adequately protective of slum dwellers.233 The jurisdictional conflict over land
tenure provisions is not surprising in light of the current state
of compliance with the 74th CAA, which is far from achieved.234
The notion that RAY’s slum-free cities program can incorporate
local voices at a time when ward committees are nonexistent or
barely functional is cause for concern. A program design that
calls upon local governments to identify slum areas and take
stock of families that will potentially get displaced in redevelopment requires a strong forum for local participation.
As such, central government actors should consider delaying
RAY until the decentralization reforms, such as those tied to
JnNURM, have taken shape. This delay has occurred in practice as a result of reluctance on the part of states to grant permanent protections to slum-dwellers. What is recommended,
however, is that the central government deliberately delay any
capital project that involves slum clearance until states have
achieved full compliance with both the letter and spirit of the
74th CAA.
To aid states and local governments on the path to decentralization, the central government should revisit the language of
the 74th CAA to remove the permissive terms around state legislative enactments and provide definitive legal authority for
local governments to assume substantive planning and urban
redevelopment functions. Similarly, the text of JnNURM
should be revisited to tie central government funding to concrete steps toward decentralization, like state municipal acts
that delegate Twelfth Schedule duties to local bodies, or the
constitution of ward committees.
A. Advancement of Decentralization Reforms
Examinations of RAY rarely address limitations in local government capacity. India’s local governance structures, particu233. See Bibek Debroy, Rajiv Awas Yojana: Government Errs by Not Assessing Similar Projects Like BSUP and IHSDP, ECON. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2012),
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-0116/news/30631808_1_bsup-slum-development-rajiv-awas-yojana
(arguing
that despite the importance of a more formal approach to slum eradication,
the central government should have done a full appraisal of related JnNURM
programs before unveiling RAY).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 140–153.
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larly the ward committees, are still relatively weak, which
makes genuine local participation a challenge.235 To move forward under the current local governance framework would undermine the spirit of RAY’s programmatic mandates and inhibit the full protection of slum dwellers that is sought under the
program.
As redevelopment progresses with the support of RAY funds,
the central government should consider how to advance decentralization reforms, as it did under JnNURM, to bolster local
government participation and capacity. One way to support decentralization is to revisit the language of the 74th CAA and
remove the permissive terms regarding the enactment of state
municipal acts. The Constitution should firmly require that
states adopt legislation to delegate the substantive duties in
the Twelfth Schedule to ULBs, and grant ULBs the power to
levy taxes and generate other forms of local revenue so they
can more effectively provide urban public goods.
As was discussed when looking at NIUA’s findings on compliance with the 74th CAA, legislation is just one step in the process toward genuine delegation of power to local governance
structures. Central government review of state delegations and
the constitution of ward committees will foster compliance with
the terms of the 74th CAA. Yet without legislative enactments,
jurisdictional conflicts are difficult to resolve and usually result
in undermining local authority.236 In addition to constitutional
reforms, adjustments should be made to the JnNURM program
to create clear benchmarks for decentralization, which states
and territories must satisfy before receiving any funding under
JnNURM.
B. Programmatic Reforms under RAY
In light of the revised bill on property rights to slum dwellers
announced in late 2012,237 there is reason to be concerned
about the rights of slum dwellers as redevelopment programs
move forward under RAY. The property rights scheme was altered markedly, from a program of ownership rights for slum
dwellers, to a program requiring only long-term leases.238 And
235.
236.
237.
238.

MATHUR, supra note 84, at 20.
Gillette, supra note 21, at 1347.
Gupta, supra note 182.
Id.
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while this significant revision may have been necessary to induce states to move forward with slum-redevelopment under
RAY, new central government interventions are now necessary
to compensate for the erosion of these tenure security provisions.239
For instance, the central government should consider (1) barring any RAY funding until certain structural changes are
made at the state level to protect slum dwellers, and (2) making the detailed commitments in state-level POAs legally enforceable. Conditioning funding on structural commitments is
low-hanging fruit in terms of programmatic reforms for RAY. A
relatively simple mechanism to ensure that states follow
through on protections to slum dwellers is to condition development funding on the passage of property rights legislation,
rather than the mere drafting and tentative approval by state
legislative bodies. The same should be true for ward committees—if ward committees are not fully constituted in the particular location where slum redevelopment is proposed, central
government funding should not be provided under RAY.
A separate reform to the property rights scheme relates to
the criminalization of slum dwellers in areas where RAY POAs
are in place. As discussed above, the new MML provides that
those who encroach on government land are subject to up to
three years of jail time, fines, or some combination of the
two.240 This is seemingly inconsistent with RAY’s core objectives, which were expressly designed to consider both curative
and preventative strategies.241 A blanket state legislative enactment that criminalizes vulnerable slum dwellers encroaching on public land may not be appropriate in all cases. A more
nuanced approach to handling the encroachment on public
lands, with an assessment of where social services and property entitlements can help to eradicate the slum in question, is
therefore advised.
In terms of the enforceability of commitments made in statelevel POAs, the central government should look at claw-back
239. See Clarke, supra note 227, at 4 (explaining how tenure security to all
slum dwellers is impractical since private landowners are unlikely to support
any legislative enactments that would provide permanent rights for slum
dwellers, and public landowners may not all agree as to where such guarantees should be made).
240. See supra text accompanying note 232.
241. SLUM FREE CITY PLAN OF ACTION, supra note 13, at 2.
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provisions to retract state funding where commitments in the
POA are not realized. Additionally, RAY places a strong emphasis on public-private partnerships to foster slum redevelopment.242 Yet, without proper safeguards, these partnerships
may erode the property rights afforded to slum dwellers, and
lead to unnecessary relocation of poor residents. A particular
focus should therefore be on local participation where publicprivate partnerships are involved, as historically, this has been
an area where local voices have been restrained.243
Until these reforms are adopted and there exists clear consensus on protections for urban slum dwellers, the central government should place Phase II of RAY on hold. Moving forward
with capital-intensive slum-clearance projects without a full
understanding of the needs of potentially displaced slum dwellers runs the risk of destabilizing the most vulnerable segments
of India’s urban poor, and merely shifts the problem of slum
development from one locale to another. Ironically, capital outlays for slum-redevelopment have already seen delays, but
those delays stem from conflicts over ratcheting down the protections for slum dwellers rather than ratcheting them up. This
is particularly worrisome as slum-redevelopment plans are
likely to be significantly disruptive for the urban poor.
CONCLUSION
While many critiques of RAY focus on the defects with the existing programmatic structure, there is a strong link between
the weak implementation of some of the 74th CAA’s core provisions, like the establishment of ward committees, and the primary concerns surrounding the adequate protection of slum
dwellers under RAY. Although RAY’s jurisdictional design is
consistent with its programmatic objectives, constitutional reform is warranted to advance a decentralization agenda that
will bolster local governance structures.
Without strong local governments, there is concern that slum
dwellers will not receive adequate procedural and substantive
protections as slum-clearance projects proceed. This concern is
heightened as RAY moves from a program that had offered
permanent property entitlements to slum dwellers, to one
where only fifteen-year leases are required. As such, removing
242. GUIDELINES FOR SLUM-FREE CITY PLANNING, supra note 183, at 3.
243. Harriss, supra note 7, at 9.
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permissive language from the 74th CAA to require state enactments supporting both the functional devolution of substantive powers to local governments and local revenue generating
authority would be an important step forward in protecting the
rights of traditionally disenfranchised slum dwellers.
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